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In this report we document the findings of a study relating to the 
assessment of various approaches to automation of flight operations, their 
impact on pilot workload and safety. The study was conducted jointly by staff 
of the Coordinated Science Laboratory and the Aviation Research Laboratory, 
both of the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Main contributors to 
this effort include R. T. Chien, P. Fitzhenry, D. Waltz, R. Hoolko, C. Jacobus, 
K. Hoover, D. Monck, D. Robins, P. Rutter, P. Satyanarayana, and T. Woo.
ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PROGRAM INTELLIGENCE 
TO ADVANCED AUTOMATION IN FLIGHT OPERATIONS
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1. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
1.1. Motivation and Scope of Study
In today's sophisticated aircraft, much emphasis has been placed on 
acquiring and displaying more and more complex information to the pilot.
This trend has resulted in ever-increasing pilot workloads.. Today's air­
craft philosophy forces the pilot to evaluate a highly complex set of input 
data, decide upon a course of action, and then implement that action in 
minimal time. Such a situation is undesirable because it increases the margin 
of pilot error and lowers the probability of mission success.
A computer system, it is argued, can provide mathematically sound, 
evaluated decisions which could reduce pilot workload and pilot error. Thus 
automation of routine functions will be the answer for future systems. The 
pilot, it is stated, can then begin to function as system manager rather 
than system component. Unfortunately this seemingly straightforward reasoning 
does not apply to critical circumstances of high workload at which time the 
attention of a pilot must be given to numerous tasks. Conventional automation 
tends to present more data to the pilot and to require him to key in requests 
for specific information. Hence it tends to lower workloads during cruise and 
other similar lower workload periods; it tends to increase workload during 
critical times such as close combat. For example, while a scanning motion 
would normally give the pilot a general idea of what state his plane is in, a 
similar scan with time-shared display may require him to key-in several 
requests by hand, a task more difficult and time-consuming for him.
In order to provide lower workload all the time and more safety 
for the pilot and the system we feel it to be necessary to consider systems
2with program intelligence. Such systems can carry out optimum decision-making 
tasks according to preset guidelines under a variety of circumstances and there­
fore can provide lower workload and improve safety in flight operations.
The purpose of this project is to identify and develop techniques 
for automating a subset of crucial pilot tasks in flight operations. These 
specific techniques and a general design philosophy are to be programmed and 
demonstrated on our computer and simulation facilities at the University of 
Illinois. These techniques will then be considered by the U. S. Air Force 
for detailed investigation and development, and for possible adoptation in 
future avionic systems.
One important goal of the first phase of this project is to give 
an in-depth analysis of the various tasks involved in flight operations and 
to give an assessment of the present trends in automation, its promises and 
drawbacks. Specific attention is given to two studies which were recently 
done and reported in
(1) Integrated Information Presentation and Control System (IIPACS),
Volume 1 through 4 by Staff of the Boeing Companyy,19711.
(2) Study of the Information Management Aspects of Integrated 
Avionics (IMS), Volumes 1 and 2 by Bernard List, Texas Instruments, 
Incorporated.
A second major goal of the first phase of this project is to 
identify candidate tasks for potential automation and to provide an (educated a 
guess as to a possible schedule for such events to take place.
The study reported here took place during a three-month period 
starting in September of 1973. During the early days of this study it became
3clear that the assessment phase should take place only after a detailed analysis 
is done on each important task area of flight operations. The task areas were 
identified to be as follows:
1. Autopilot and Stability Augmentation
2. Fuel Management
3. Energy Management
4. Navigation
5. Degraded Mode Operation
6. Weapon Delivery
Detailed analysis of these areas are presented in Sections 2.1 
through 2.6. Further comments are given in Section 2.7. A general appraisal 
is given in Sections 3.1 through 3.4. A description of some important char­
acteristics of a fully-automated system is given in Sections 4.1 through 4.3. 
Concluding remarks and recommendations are given in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
1.2. Summary of Assessment of IIPACS and IMS
This section is a summary of an appraisal by ARL/CSL of the IIPACS/lMS 
with respect to conventional aircraft systems and to systems using programmed 
intelligence beyond IIPACS/lMS.
In IIPACS and IMS, which are the baseline documents for this contract, 
is developed the concept that the pilot should be a manager with responsibility 
for high-order decisions. The pilot sets up Autopilot modes, flies the aircraft 
during transitions between modes or when a mode is not available which fits his 
current phase in the mission. Otherwise he is not required to actually fly the 
aircraft. The pilot has access to information bases such as fuel remaining,
4optimal energy management profiles, communications from a central controller, 
known failures within his aircraft system, current weapons available. The 
pilot brings these bases to bear upon the mission expectations and the pilot's 
past experience and training. The result is a plan or a set of procedures which 
the pilot sets up such as Autopilot modes or arming a weapon. Terms describing 
the tasks done by pilots in an IIPACS/lMS system are monitoring, target recognition, 
setting-up, keying-in, reading, interpreting, selecting, communicating, and 
eating.
IIPACS/lMS was designed to have a major impact on pilot workload and 
indeed they do. A large complement of aids are available to the pilot. Flight 
control is accomplished by direct pilot command of control surfaces or by six 
Autopilot modes. The pilot can choose one or more modes depending on whether 
they are conflicting or not. An example of conflicting modes are altitude hold 
and terrain following. The pilots' control authority over the aircraft has been 
reduced to gain stability augmentation and control harmonization. These are 
basic servo loop tasks the pilot performs in conventional aircraft. The system 
does not check for reasonableness of possible structural damage to the aircraft 
or entry of an unsafe flying mode.
The navigation system has a similar architecture. A variety of 
modes, namely, Doppler, inertial, and satellite, are offered which are 
appropriate in terms of accuracy and reliability for different phases of 
a mission. A concerted effort was made to automatically check whether a 
mode is operating and if it is not, to use the next best nav aid available.
In the conventional system, the nav aids selection, fault detection and 
switching is basically the pilot's responsibility. To a large extent
5IIPACS/lMS is a system with a very complex sensor or a set of sensors with 
complex rules for selection of an appropriate nav aid. IIPACS/lMS has 
automated nav aid selection based on what is most accurate and available.
The data goes to map displays, command bar displays, and the Autopilot.
In a system with programmed intelligence this represents a very useful 
data base and there are no glaring shortcomings with the IIPACS/lMS system.
IIPACS/lMS provides the pilot a large array of computed data 
displays, energy management, command bars, fire control symbology, which 
are more usable or concise than the raw data being operated on. This feature 
is lacking in scope on conventional aircraft where airborne computation power 
is restricted by current technology. IIPACS/lMS views energy management 
optimization of a flight profile with respect to time, fuel, range, or safety, 
as aids to pilot action in setting the aircraft throttle and attitude. The 
displays are basically graphical. The command bar displays are simpler and 
easier to interpret than the graphical types but are not as blunder proof.
The fire control symbology is a form of a command bar display where missile 
capability, range to target, and optimal release point are computed and dis­
played. Lack of computed data displays requires the pilot to either perform 
the computation or sacrifice optimal performance and make decisions which have 
large tolerances for error. Weapons release may be consistently done too close 
to target making the aircraft too vulnerable. Energy profiles may be stored 
in the pilot's head and used as deemed appropriate. These are crude approxima­
tions to what could be achieved by a computer using a large number of sensors, 
temperature, airspeed, aircraft weight, etc., and optimizing the profile to 
the specific condition or state of the aircraft.
6Failure prediction, detection, and correction is incorporated in 
IIPACS/lMS. The aircraft components covered under this failure monitor do 
not have to be constantly monitored by the pilot, as in conventional air­
craft systems. Nor does the pilot have to decode on its priority or on 
remedial actions. IIPACS/lMS does provide trending on certain major 
components using vibration or oil analysis as indicators. Many failure 
detections are left up to the pilot to find and he must be constantly 
monitoring the aircraft system for possible breakdowns. Actions to be 
taken on multiple failures are the pilot's decision in IIPACS/lMS. The 
conventional system automatic failure detection system is usually limited 
to critical components, such as control surface actuators.
As will happen when a radically new system is introduced, the 
workload in some areas will decrease but will increase in other areas.
When the pilot is required to read text or key-in a request to the computer 
system, he is performing work not usually found in abundance in the cockpit. 
The capability of putting displays on any of 2 or 3 different displays is a 
great hedge against failure of a display, but can hinder finding information 
by looking at its home position on the cockpit. While some memorization has 
been reduced (e.g. by including optimal climb profiles in the information 
retrieval system) the procedure for operating the information retrieval system 
must itself be memorized.
A negative transfer of training from conventional aircraft systems 
to the IIPACS/lMS aircraft will be another pilot problem. Old reactions and 
routines no longer apply directly since the cockpit concept is so different.
The pilot is still the focal point during emergencies and combat 
maneuvers in IIPACS/lMS. These are high workload situations to begin with
7and these are the crucial areas for mission success. Even in the normal course 
of operations the pilot is required to do a lot of set-up, such as selecting, 
fusing, and sequencing a weapon. Display update rates on some of the computed 
displays are not real time. This decreases their value during combat, where 
high performance maneuvers are common.
What a system with programmed intelligence can offer beyond IIPACS/IMS 
is an alternate path that does not require pilot intervention for some decision 
making required in a fighter cockpit. A system with programmed intelligence 
has the potential for access to a larger information base than the pilot. In 
some forms of information processing, it can be much faster. Areas such as 
failure monitoring, energy management and flight safety, natural language 
communication between pilot and aircraft systems, and airborne flight planning 
are the most promising for early systems with programmed intelligence.
If pilot workload is to be reduced the computer system must be 
given some authority to control the aircraft system. This implies that 
the hardware linkages exist and the pilot is willing to delegate the authority. 
This will not be a total delegation in all cases since a system with programmed 
intelligence in the near future will not have capabilities the pilot has in the 
areas of pattern recognition and total natural language communication with the 
outside world.
1.3. Summary of Conclusion and Recommendations
The following is a summary of our conclusion and recommendations:
1. Conventional automation techniques as proposed in IIPACS/IMS 
are useful for many circumstances. Many of these techniques 
can be incorporated into aircrafts of the 1975-80 period,
although certain improvements should be made regarding
/
the man-machine interface.
8
2. The current trend in computer hardware cost reduction will 
most likely continue. This fact plus the compactness of LSI 
technology will encourage the development of large scale data 
bases that will form the backbone of intelligent routines.
By and large these systems can be constructed with conven­
tional software. However, we believe the concepts of programmed 
intelligence should be employed to achieve better performance and 
to lay the proper foundation for the transition to baseline 
intelligent systems.
3. Many of the large data base intelligent routines eventually 
will be of the complexity of OS360. No simple formula can be 
used to describe the performance of a software system of this 
complexity. These systems must be open-ended and debuggable by 
sections. The only meaningful approach to the design of such 
systems is to set organization guidelines and to use a modular 
approach as much as possible. Thus the concepts of heterarchy, 
automatic deduction, and flexible control structure will be 
necessary.
4. The age of intelligent routines will definitely be the transitional 
period between conventional software organization and software 
organization with the AI approach. Both approaches will make 
extensive use of low-level software routines of conventional
nature.
95. In order to spearhead the development of intelligent 
systems we propose to develop a prototype intelligent 
system with the capabilities to automatically
(1) detect and predict failure;
(2) operate in degraded modes; and
(3) communicate at intelligent levels with man and 
machines.
In order to demonstrate our accomplishments in realistic
\
environments via computer simulation we also plan to 
carry out a number of subprojects including
(4) the construction of a data base;
(5) the development of a pseudo-natural language 
communications capability; and
(6) the construction of failure model for diagnosis.
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2. TASK ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT
2.1» Autopilot and Stability Augmentation
2.1.1. Introduction
The Autopilot does lower level computations and actuates the aircraft's 
control surfaces. For most purposes it can be considered as a feedback control 
mechanism capable of maintaining any one of several flight parameters. For 
example, the pilot may select parameters such as altitude or heading which the 
Autopilot will then maintain.
The Autopilot is discussed further in the sections covering energy 
management and navigation.
2.1.2. Conventional Autopilots
The Autopilot is probably the most automated subsystem in a conven­
tional airplane. Currently, Autopilots are used primarily for those phases of 
a mission which do not represent high workload for the pilot, such as flying 
from home base to the target area. Most Autopilots in conventional aircraft 
are built as autonomous systems, i.e. They have only limited inputs from 
other subsystems, and computations are not performed in a central computer.
2.1.3. The IIPACS Autopilot
The IIPACS system provides six autopilot modes. Incompatible modes 
are disconnected automatically when the pilot selects a new mode,
1) Control stick steer— Autopilot has control of stick.
2) Navigation steer— navigation system supplies all commands.
3) Speed control--speed is keyed and held constant.
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4) Altitude hold--altitude is keyed and held constant.
5) Automatic terrain following--displacement from ground set
and held.
6) Automatic wing sweep--sweep angle is automatically set as
a function of speed.
By providing many modes of automatic flight, the IIPACS system 
made itself very flexible. Since several modes are available, the pilot 
can choose whatever function he wants to be taken over by the computer. For 
instance, if he wants to delegate the function of controlling the speed with­
out at the same time giving up heading control, he can do so by selecting the 
speed control mode. Similarly he can select several non-conflicting modes 
simultaneously.
In the IIPACS system the computational functions of the Autopilot 
and stability augmentation are performed in the central computer. The authors 
claim that the feedback sensors for the Autopilot are redundant enough to ensure 
safe flight. Single channel failure in the stability augmentation system is 
indicated by master caution flashing and readout on a MPD (multipurpose display); 
dual channel failure is indicated by master caution flashing, readout on a MPD 
and a voice warning. Whenever two or more channels fail to work the system 
suggests the best mode to the pilot and advises him to land as soon as 
possible.
2.1.4. Problems
One problem is the IIPACS system's inability to reject a command 
to the Autopilot if it is not a safe one. The Autopilot faithfully obeys 
any command it receives either externally from the pilot or internally from
12
the navigation system. If the command is unsafe and given either by mistake 
or because of ignorance about the state of the aircraft, the system (either 
the Autopilot or some higher level decision maker) should reject that command 
and inform the pilot. For instance, an attempt to enter the altitude hold 
mode during a landing should be rejected. Similarly, attempts to maintain a 
collision course should be questioned.
The IIPACS Autopilot could be further expanded. Automatic take­
off and landing capabilities (already available in some aircraft) were not 
considered in the IIPACS system.
2.1.5. DC-10 Performance and Failure Assessment Monitor
This system is an automatic landing system and monitor of the type 
postulated above. It provides a landing display that has the same landing 
queues as those described in the IIPACS navigation section displayed on the 
VSD (vertical situation display). The runway is traced and a cross is placed 
on the line drawing of the runway to indicate the projected point of contact.
The system follows a radio beacon down to the runway, compensating for deviations 
due to environment or internal aircraft disturbances. The response of the air­
craft is anticipated faster than real time via a generalized 4th order approxi­
mation of the aircraft system dynamics. These calculations are used to project 
aircraft glide path and are compared to actual response. If substantial devia­
tion occurs the system calls for pilot assistance. This system promises to be 
extremely useful in low visibility conditions.
2.2. Fuel Management and CG Control 
2.2.1. Introduction
Controlling fuel utilization is essential to aircraft performance
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and mission success. Minimizing fuel consumption can decrease the number of 
air refuels. Monitoring and predicting fuel consumption can eliminate the 
danger of running out of fuel.
CG (center of gravity) control refers to the shifting of fuel between 
tanks to alter or maintain the aircraft's center of gravity. CG control is 
essential to flight safety and aircraft maneuverability. Loss of CG control 
may lead to a stall, and makes landing and engine-out operation very dangerous.
It is not possible to totally isolate the fuel management and CG 
control functions from the other aircraft systems. Fuel management is a 
corollary function of navigation in that it both requires information from and 
supplies information to the navigation system. Similarly, CG control is a 
corollary function to the Autopilot, since a change in the flight mode may 
require a shift of the center of gravity. Fuel management and CG control can 
also be considered as part of energy management, since they both affect 
various energy envelopes. In this section, we will use the term fuel management 
to refer primarily to long term fuel usage. Short term fuel usage is covered 
in the energy management section.
2.2.2. Conventional Systems
The pilot has switches to select the tank used to supply a particular 
engine. He can also activate pumps to shift fuel between tanks, in order to 
change or maintain CG Position. Most computation and control is done by the 
pilot on all but a few conventional airplanes.
2.2.3. The IMS System
IMS contains a fairly complete discussion of fuel management,
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including detailed flowcharts and equations. Indeed, a fuel management 
program has been written in their recommended higher level language, TPL 
(about 200 lines of code), and an estimate of how often the program should 
be run has been made (about twice per second).
The IMS fuel management system monitors fuel use and gives the 
pilot planning and control information. As a planner, the system provides 
updates of the estimates in flight as the mission proceeds. As a control aid, 
the system computes power settings for optimum energy utilization, and presents 
these to the pilot. As a monitor, the system periodically checks the mission 
progress and fuel remaining. If the system detects a fuel emergency it alerts 
the pilot.
2.2.4. The IIPACS System
The IIPACS study does not have as detailed a discussion of fuel 
management and CG control as the IMS study. However, it does have a proposed 
layout for the display and control switches associated with these functions. 
This panel displays the total amount of fuel in each tank and the current 
center of gravity. In addition, a bar graph of fuel remaining displays:
1) the amount of fuel to reach target (by the preplanned route), 2) the 
amount needed to fly the remainder of the preplanned route, and 3) the 
amount required to return directly to home base from the present position. 
Simple switches allow for manual override and manual tank selection. The 
fuel dump switch and air refuel switch are also located here.
Fuel management and CG control are usually considered as fairly 
low level functions, and they are mostly ”submerged"in the IIPACS and IMS 
layout of functions. Therefore they usually do not provide a high pilot
15
workload in the proposed 1975/1980 airplane.
2.2.5. Problems
There are two cases where the pilot is still in the fuel management 
control loop. These are:
1. Major inflight changes to the flight plan, such as a change 
in route or destination. In these cases, it is clearly desirable for the 
fuel utilization to remain "hidden” as long as there is sufficient fuel for 
the new plan. This means that changes to the flight plan (stored in the 
computer and used by both the navigation and fuel management routines), should 
be allowed by the fuel management routines if the changes are possible. All 
that the pilot should have to know is what fuel will remain if he makes the 
proposed change, and perhaps, how the remaining fuel compares with the amounts 
in the original flight plan. Ideally, the navigation routines should not 
require the pilot to do anything but enter the new end points of the route 
change; in the IIPACS/IMS systems the pilot must also check whether the fuel 
remaining is reasonable for the proposed change.
2. Emergencies, i.e. when the airplane is going to run out of 
fuel. This would seem to be the situation where IIPACS is most in need of 
improvement. It is not at all clear that it is good, necessary, or sufficient 
to turn on a "bingo" light when fuel remaining is insufficient to return home. 
One problem is that the fuel management routines do not know what else is going 
on at the time the bingo light goes on (for example, the pilot may be making
a landing or taking evasion measures and the light would be a serious 
distraction).
The problem of emergency procedures can be extended to a general
16
criticism of IIPACS/IMS. There is no possible solution to this problem as 
long as the "operating system" that ties the functions together is either 
non-existant or inflexible. The IMS designers at least realized that having 
the CPU execute a simple circular list of jobs would not be adequate. To 
improve the handling of emergency procedures, one has to forego the simplistic 
idea that any system should be allowed to take over a display (and the pilot’s 
attention) whenever it independently discovers an error or a dangerous situa­
tion. A higher level program must interpret requests for emergency actions 
by lower level programs with an understanding of the current environment and 
state of both the pilot and the airplane. One wants to resort to alarms as 
seldom as possible, not only to bother the pilot less, but also so he will be 
more likely to react to them properly. In the general case, the program should 
not assume its job is over once an emergency has been signalled, but rather 
it should check to make sure that corrective action is taken.
4
2.2.6. Summary
To summarize, fuel management and CG control are functions which 
are (in IIPACS/IMS type aircraft) almost completely automated. They are 
closely connected with the navigation/autopilot routines and take little 
CPU time. In normal situations the IIPACS/IMS systems are probably sufficiently 
flexible. They are invoked automatically to provide data base updates and also 
when needed to estimate and display how proposed course changes affect the fuel
utilization. There is need for improvement in the handling of emergencies,
1
but only major system redesign can provide satisfactory operation in emergency
situations.
17
2.3. Energy Management 
2.3.1. Introduction
The importance of having an effective energy management system aboard 
the Mach 2 fighter aircraft is apparent when its environment is considered.
A maximum rate climb out can consume 50 percent of total aircraft fuel.
Combat times are on the order of five minutes. A four second saving in 
time of an optimal manuever can make the difference between a successful 
intercept and the loss of a defended target. Given this fast, high stress 
environment, a system which will manage the aircraft energy optimally, monitor 
the energy state against safety envelopes, and, in general, reduce pilot 
workload will be a valuable aid to pilot performance and mission success.
Efficient use of energy requires a repertoire of optimal energy 
profiles. For instance a loiter would require a maximum endurance profile, 
intercept of another fighter minimum time climb profile. Other possible 
profiles include minimum fuel climb, minimum range climb, and maximum range 
cruise. Since a mission for a fighter consists of a series of subgoals, each 
with its own optimal profile, an optimal transistion from profile to profile 
is also needed.
To keep the aircraft energy state from leaving safety boundaries, 
be it from a pilot who is following an overly enthusiastic energy profile, 
or from one who is inattentive of an instrument, an energy state monitor 
is recommended. This monitor's function is to keep the aircraft from 
suffering structural damage from excessive G-load or airspeed, and from 
inadvertently entering a stall, spin or region of reversed command. Also 
this monitor should constantly check current energy capability against the
18
energy needed to avoid external obstructions such as the ground or other 
aircraft.
The energy management system must reduce the pilot workload or 
its full potential capability will not be realized. If a pilot does not 
have the time to set up or interpret a mode of energy management he might 
as well not have it available. Energy management displays should present 
data in easily understood formats, with the amount of data displayed 
reduced to a minimum. Data formats could be the raw data, such as altitude
V
or mach number, command bar displays, graphic displays, alphanumeric 
displays, control feel from yoke or stick, or auditory signals. Graphical 
formats and exception data displays, displaying data out of norm, are 
ways of reducing the amount of data shown to the pilot.
The energy management system should have the capability of 
directly driving the Autopilot, thus relieving the pilot from the job of 
closing the loop between energy management and aircraft controls. The 
pilot should have override capabilities on the Autopilot. The effect of 
his override can be displayed to him through exception data displays 
or control feel pressure on the stick.
A properly designed energy management system can both reduce 
pilot workload by helping him select the proper flight profile and improve 
aircraft performance. A poor system may improve performance in light 
workload periods, but not get used at all when it is needed most. The 
energy management system can display tradeoffs in time, fuel, and airspeed. 
Given an idea of what the impact of a profile will be, the pilot can reduce 
the uncertainty in selecting a profile. Decision making on a more global
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scale can also be aided by an energy management system since the computed 
tradeoffs can be used by other aircraft subsystems.
2.3.2. Conventional Approach to Energy Management
A good deal of the conventional energy management system resides 
within the pilot. He is trained on the ground what the general guidelines 
and tradeoffs are. He has a set of numbers and procedures memorized or 
available as checklists in the cockpit. When he desires a cruise speed 
he uses the one he has memorized. The pilot optimizes a parameter by 
making perturbations around the selected cruise speed and observing the 
effect on the variable to be optimized. He also memorizes the raw data 
boundaries of the safety envelope and checks these against the actual 
raw data, airspeed etc.
Airborne computer aids to the pilot are limited: simple cal­
culation of steady-state time in air with remaining fuel is an example.
The computer usually has some access to aircraft controls in the form of 
wing sweep angle and center of gravity location through fuel shifting.
Displays present raw data: altitude, airspeed, and attitudes.
Some first order safety envelope violations are detected and alarms sounded
to alert the pilot, and some processed data is presented to the pilot for his
information, fot example range or time to go before fuel is depleted.
*
Autopilot utilization is usually through the pilot. He selects 
altitudes and headings, sets up the Autopilot and transfers control to it.
The pilot makes changes by resetting the Autopilot. This utilization 
of the Autopilot is separate from the link to it from the navigation
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system. The computer does control wing sweep angle and fuel location. 
Terrain avoidance systems operate under full computer control.
2.3.3. IIPACS/lMS Approach to Energy Management
IIPACS/IMS energy management systems start with ground training 
of the pilot, building on the training given pilots of conventional 
aircraft. Further instruction is given to the pilot on how to use 
displays which reflect an expanded computer-based energy management 
system. Some display types, command bars, dials, and alphanumeric 
displays, will be familiar to the pilot of conventional aircraft. However, 
the graphical display format will be a new cockpit display type for 
the pilot. The pilot must learn how to use the computer-aided energy 
management system with the ease and regularity that he uses the navigation 
system.
The IIPACS/IMS computer system is available as a storehouse of 
checklists and integrated displays with current air data parameters shown 
in relation to other aircraft numbers. The pilot is still required to 
know the aircraft numbers, stall speeds and other aircraft performance 
indices.
The IIPACS/IMS airborne computer aids are extensions of the 
conventional system, IIPACS does expand on the optimization of aircraft 
performance and energy state with respect to a safety envelope. This 
concept is called the integrated total energy management system (ITEMS).
The computer system has access to real-time data on angle of attack, 
attitude, control surface deflections, G-load, thrust, static pressure, 
dynamic pressure, air temperature, altitude and other variables representing
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the changing conditions of flight. Given these inputs the computer 
develops schedules for flight profiles which are optimized with respect 
to minimum energy, minimum time, or maximum range and safe flight 
operating conditions. The pilot has access to these schedules through 
the cockpit displays and to some extent the energy management system can 
control the Autopilot directly.
The displays used by items are as follows:
On a primary display is the energy control director of ECD 
(Figure 1). It uses a variable size circle with variable rectangles 
inside of it. The ECD indicates to the pilot the necessary adjustments 
of pitch, roll, and longitudinal energy to stay with the necessary flight 
plan. Command bars are also on the display to indicate pitch, rate of 
pitch, roll, and rate of roll, and rate of roll to minimize energy 
expended.
The pilot can also call up three supplemental energy management 
displays for guidance on optimum settings of the aircraft controls and 
prediction on where the state of the aircraft will be in the near future.
The first display is altitude vs. range (Figure 2). It includes a curve
/
for minimum time climb to a predetermined position, one for maximum range 
climb, and a dot and arrow indicating the aircraft's present position, 
magnitude and direction of motion relative to the curves.
The second display is velocity vs. G-load (Figure 3). It 
graphs an envelope and the present position and direction of motion of 
the aircraft relative to the envelope. It presents to the pilot an 
indication of the aircraft approaching an unsafe flight condition relative 
to the plane's configuration and load conditions.
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Figure lf Energy Control Director Display (ECD)
Figure 2. Optimization Display-Altitude vs. Range
The steeper curve indicates the maximum rate 
climb, and the other curve indicates the 
maximum range climb. The circle and arrow 
indicate current aircraft state.
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Figure 3. Velocity vs. G-load Envelope Display
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The third display is thrust vs. airspeed (Figure 4). The two 
curves are: the total available thrust for a given altitude and airspeed,
and the thrust required to maintain an airspeed for the existing conditions. 
The dot and arrow represents the aircraft. The triangle indicates the 
condition required to obtain maximum range and the square indicates the 
maximum endurance condition. This display is used to obtain maximum 
range or endurance flight or to properly control the airplane during 
landings or degraded mode engine-out conditions.
Utilization of the Autopilot by IIPACS/IMS tends to be limited 
to certain modes and certain control features. There appears to be connec­
tion to the Autopilot in the minimum energy mode only. The control appears 
to be limited to attitude and heading. Throttle is still under pilot 
control.
2.3.4. IIPACS/IMS Critique
The IIPACS/IMS systems are improvements over conventional energy 
management systems. The airborne computer aids the pilot in making the 
decision on what control movements are needed for optimal flight paths 
and in showing how close the aircraft energy state is to unsafe 
conditions. Even if the computations are not truly optimal or real time 
they are more accurate than the pilot's intuition for what is optimal 
or safe. The energy management connection to the Autopilot has the 
capability of relieving the pilot of the tracking task necessary to 
maintain a flight mode.
The displays of graphical data and command bars relative to 
energy management are aids not available in the conventional system. At
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Figure 4. Thrust vs. Airspeed Envelope Display
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a glance the pilot obtains information on how close to a trajectory or 
a dangerous mode of flight he is. The command bars require no decisions 
by the pilot on how much his control movements should lead the aircraft 
to prevent overshooting a selected profile. A large class of raw data 
does not have to be monitored by the pilot except when absolutely needed.
2.3.5. Problems
Improvement is needed on the real time computation capability 
of the airborne computer. The pilot must fall back on his experience 
during modes where the computer cannot provide the needed information.
Since the ability to be real time probably has meant compromises on a 
calculation of the true optimal paths or energy states, improved hardware 
that does allow true optimal calculations would be an improvement. In 
IIPACS, the modes presented are valid for one or two dimensions only and 
the situation actually involves more dimensions.
Some displays require interpretation by the pilot as to which 
control movements are necessary to bring the aircraft state to the desired 
point. Making command bars available would reduce pilot workload. Allowing 
the energy rmanagement system to have further control of the Autopilot 
would make possible more complete automation. This also requires constant 
computer monitoring of commands sent to the Autopilot to be sure that air­
craft loading or overall mission success is not compromised. If modes 
desired are conflicting the computer can offer as a compromise a set of 
commands that allows some gains from the modes to be realized rather than 
allowing only one mode at a time. If a clear priority of one mode is 
necessary then the computer should allow only that mode. The system should
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allow pilot override of the Autopilot with appropriate feedback, such as 
control feel, warning the pilot that optimization is being sacrificed.
The energy management system offers a storehouse of information 
which can be brought to bear against decisions the pilot must make. By 
showing what the aircraft energy state would be at the completion of 
different modes the pilot can see what the tradeoffs are. If & computer 
is required to make high level mission decisions the energy management 
system can input information to that decision-making computer.
2.4. Navigation
2.4.1. Introduction
On modern jet aircraft; navigation and Autopilot subsystems to 
augment the pilot's skills are absolutely essential. The functions of 
such systems include control of the aircraft air surfaces, heading 
calculation, course corrections, and navigational equipment fault 
detection.
The primary functions of an Autopilot are to accept from some 
source (the pilot or navigation system) the desired heading, speed and 
rate of climb and use this information to actuate the systems for operation 
of the control surfaces. For convenience the Autopilot should be able 
to accept changes in single inputs as well as complete change? of all 
inputs. An Autopilot may also include automatic takeoff and landing 
capabilities. In addition, systems for stability augmentation and center 
of gravity control must be either included in the Autopilot subsystem 
or be in direct communication with this subsystem.
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The exact form of the heading data to the Autopilot is dictated 
by the complexities of the navigation system and Autopilot, although it 
is always a velocity vector specifying speed and direction in three space.
The Autopilot does not keep track of the aircraft's current position.
Automatic takeoff and landing abilities are important in poor 
visibility situations and will have significant benefits in terms of 
safety in the near future. These systems are designed to home into the 
runway by following a directional short range radio transmission. As 
the aircraft deviates from the required glide path the radio signal 
changes to indicate the need for a course correction. If the aircraft 
system does not respond to the corrections the way a faster than real 
time model of the system does and the deviation is of significant magni­
tude a failure condition is detected and contingency plans are put into 
effect. It is now very expensive to add these capabilities to conventional 
aircraft* but if an aircraft already includes on-board computers and 
integrated avionics systems, the additional cost of adding these capabilities 
may not be very high. (see Section 2.1.5.)
Center of gravity control is necessary to maintain aircraft 
maneuverability. The primary way of affecting the center of gravity is 
by properly distributing aircraft fuel, the pumping of fuel between various 
tanks should be done under the command of the Autopilot.
A navigation system is needed to monitor current aircraft state, 
calculate deviation from the aircraft's prescribed state trajectory, and 
initiate the proper maneuvers to minimize these deviations. A good system 
should monitor pilot (or other system manager) requests and determine 
whether the requests are possible to perform given the overall mission
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constraints. In addition to following a prescribed state trajectory, the 
good navigation system will be able to make temporary deviations from the 
set course to avoid obstacles detected in flight which were unforeseen 
but moving in a predictable manner. Examples of such obstacles are 
severe weather systems and other aircraft.
The navigation system may use a wide variety of different position, 
velocity, and acceleration sensing devices. Among these are the inertial 
platform, satellite link, ground based radio link, Doppler radar, 
ground communications through the pilot, altimeter, rate of climb indi­
cator, and airspeed indicator. Each of these gives information for 
navigational calculations to varying degrees of accuracy. The most 
accurate is usually the satellite link, but because this depends on 
radio transmission the most important navigational aid is the inertial 
platform. The platform is totally self-contained within the aircraft 
so it is not too dependent on outside conditions. The inertial platform 
is not a direct indicator of position; rather it calculates position by 
integrating the forces and torques on a gyroscope caused by aircraft 
movement. The platform must therefore be updated by the satellite link 
or ground based radio link to maintain long time accuracy. Indicators 
such as the altimeter and the airspeed indicator are relatively inaccurate, 
but they are useful in checking data received from more reliable sources 
such as the inertial platform, Doppler radar, and/or ground based radio 
link.
Some method for determining the most accurate navigational data 
is necessary. Many systems use the Kalman optimal filter technique to
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estimate an accurate system state. However, to increase long time 
accuracy it is also necessary to determine if particular sensors are 
regularly displaying large deviations from the calculated estimations.
If this condition exists the sensor is probably faulty, and the system 
should completely ignore it. Exactly what "regularly" means depends on 
the instrument in question.
In response to pilot or other system manager requests the 
navigational system should indicate the results of the requests and suggest 
alternatives for dealing with hazardous conditions that arise. The 
navigation system should be in communication with the fuel management 
system to determine if the aircraft has the fuel to carry out the trajectory 
requested. Knowledge of the terrain is important so that requests can be 
checked for possible collisions and so that the system can display helpful 
navigation maps or other navigation aids. The navigation system should be 
informed of damage to the aircraft so that estimates of structural and 
electrical integrity can be included in the evaluation of maneuver and 
destination requests.
The navigation system should supplement its knowledge of the 
current terrain below the aircraft through communication with obstacle 
detection systems, most notably the pilot and the radar system. If an 
obstacle displays smooth movement or the object is stationary, the naviga­
tion system should be able to plot an optimal trajectory around the obstacle 
automatically. Such a feature is not intended to be particularly useful 
in evading other man-controlled devices capable of executing complex 
maneuvers. In general, automatic detection of obstacles from radar
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inputs is an extremely difficult task and warrants a good deal of independent 
research.
2.4.2. The IIPACS Autopilot and Navigation System
The IIPACS Autopilot couples the pilot and the navigation system 
to the physical controls of the aircraft. As an aid to pilot control, the 
system may be operated through six pilot selected (and deselected) Auto­
pilot modes. These are:
1) Control stick steer--Autopilot has control of stick.
2) Navigation steer— navigation system supplies all commands.
3) Speed control--speed is keyed and held constant.
4) Altitude hold--altitude is keyed and held constant.
5) Automatic terrain following--displacement from ground set and 
held.
6) Automatic wing sweep--sweep angle is automatically set as 
a function of speed.
In addition to these functions the autopilot continuously monitors and 
effects changes in the aircraft stability. As modes are selected and 
deselected the center of gravity and stability parameters of the aircraft 
are modified to be consistent with the mode of automatic control specified.
Autopilot malfunctions are displayed via "bingo" lights. The 
vertical situation display (VSD) is used for pilot queues such as the 
roll index, roll attitude, yaw deflection, and pitch reference under 
normal conditions. When flying in terrain following mode the VSD is
l
also used to pictorially display information for aircraft orientation
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with respect to the ground. Figure 1 shows this display. Altitude, 
thrust, airspeed, and climb rate are indicated by bargraph displays.
The primary function of the navigational system is to provide 
enroute navigation information and fly the aircraft to the destination.
The navigational system described in the IIPACS manuals is comprised of 
three basic subsystems--Doppler radar, inertial platform, and satellite. 
These are augmented with ground map radar, radio data link, and ground 
radio location systems (direct ranging radio systems). A back up 
simplified inertial system is provided for degraded mode navigation.
The IIPACS navigational system uses a Kalman optimal estima­
tion technique for making estimates of the aircraft state from a myriad 
of redundant sensors. The satellite is the preferred navigation aid and 
is capable of direct positional feedback if the navigational system can 
reach 4 different satellites (3 satellites determine latitude and longitude, 
the fourth altitude). The most frequently used system is the inertial 
platform. The inertial system is periodically updated by the most accurate 
estimation available of current position of the aircraft (the output from 
the estimation routines). The Loran and Omega hyperbolic radio systems 
are preferred over the direct ranging radio systems (TACAN, VORTAC, etc.) 
because they do not depend as heavily on complex ground based equipment 
close to the area of aircraft operation. (See Figure 5.)
The hierarchy of navigation system configurations is as follows: 
(listed in order of confidence)
1) Navigational satellite
2) Doppler radar, inertial platform, ground map radar
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Satellite 1) LORAN 1) DISTANCE MEASURING 1) INERTIAL PLATFORM
Receiving System 2) OMEGA EQUIP 2) GROUND MAP RADAR
2) TACAN 3) DOPPLER RADAR
3) VORTAC
4) CLASS
Figure 5, . Classes of Navigation System
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3) Doppler radar, inertial platform, direct range radio
4) Free inertial, ground map radar
5) Free inertial, direct range radio
6) Free inertial
7) Ground map radar with heading information
8) Direct range radio with heading information
9) Doppler radar, air data--airspeed, altimeter, etc.
10) Air data--air data dead reckoning
Navigation satellite failure causes reliance on the Doppler radar and 
radio nav updated inertial system. On inertial system failure the 
navigation system uses Doppler radar and radio nav data. As the best 
equipment in the system ceases to function the system reverts to more 
primitive forms of navigation. If all else fails, the system reverts 
to air data dead reckoning. A system block diagram is shown in Figure 6.
Navigation ground map information is shown as contours on the 
horizontal situation display (HSD) to augment traditional radar displays. 
Other information such as headings, altitudes, latitudes, longitudes, and 
radio station frequencies are shown on special purpose alphanumeric 
displays. As an additional aid, landing queues are shown on the VSD and 
a multipurpose display. The VSD shows a line drawing of how the landing 
approach should look through the aircraft cockpit window. The multi­
purpose display shows the same situation from a side view.
The Autopilot described in this study is flexible, but because 
of the way this flexibility was achieved it is quite easy to misuse the 
Autopilot controls. In a high workload situation the pilot might easily
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Figure 6. IIPACS Navigation Computer Block Diagram
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key in incompatible mode specifications. The last set of mutually 
compatible modes will be the ones selected. This could mean that a busy 
pilot might not notice the error until he attempted an emergency maneuver. 
This type of problem could be partially solved by redefining modes so there 
are no such contradictory commands. The problem with this approach is 
that either we cut down on the flexibility of the Autopilot or we increase 
the already large number of keys which the pilot must remember.
The IIPACS study is primarily concerned with information display 
for the navigation function even though there is a link between the 
navigation section and the Autopilot. The IIPACS navigational aids 
displays are quite good and should be part of any automated system of 
this kind. However, the total system is much more helpful to the pilot 
in cases where a mission goes according to plan than where it deviates 
from the plan. Unfortunately, this means that the pilot gets aid in low 
workload situations, but little relief in high workload cases. As an 
example, in a degraded mode situation, the flight models may no longer 
apply, and so intact portions of the navigation system may no longer be 
useful.
2.4.3. The IMS Navigation System
This study treats navigation calculations with greater depth, 
but has postulated approximately the same type of system as the IIPACS 
study. Kalman optimal filtering is again used to estimate the aircraft 
state from Doppler radar, Loran radio, Tacan radio, search radar, 
air data, and inertial guidance. One major difference is that this study
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does not examine the possibility of satellite navigation systems. Inertial 
navigation is therefore this system's primary navigational aid. The 
calculation of navigation data is emphasized because the IMS study deals 
with the specification of an avionics central processor.
2.5. Degraded Mode Operations
2.5.1. Introduction
The objective of degraded mode analysis and operation is two­
fold: to automatically identify failures and their nature, and to reduce
the workload of the pilot during critical periods in flight. We emphasize 
the importance of computer-aided decision-making during high workload 
situations.
In fact, failure recognition is one of the most difficult aspects 
of any proposed automatic flight control system for an airplane; certain 
problems can only be recognized by comparing several parameters, each of 
which may by itself appear normal.
2.5.2. Conventional Approach
One of the major responsibilities of the pilot in a conventional 
aircraft is to constantly monitor the flight information and maintain the 
proper operation of the aircraft. Due to the overwhelming amount of informa 
tion available at any given time, the pilot must sort, search, and integrate 
the information in a systemized manner. In conventional aircraft, there 
appears to be no systematic way of even displaying this information to the 
pilot in an integrated fashion; the pilot must make all decisions requiring 
intelligence.
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2.5.3. General Description of Problem
2.5.3.1. IIPACS Goals
IIPACS dedicated an entire volume (Vol. Ill) of its study to 
degraded mode analysis. In that volume different kinds of failures during 
various aspects of the mission are documented along with the corrective 
procedures. Whenever a failure occurs, the major emphasis is on warning 
the pilot and then supplying him with preprogrammed emergency operations.
The system only displays information appropriate to the given emergency 
so as not to increase the pilot's workload by having him search through 
irrelevant material.
2.5.3.2. IIPACS Implementation
IIPACS Volume III classifies flight system information require­
ments according to specific degraded modes. Thus it becomes possible for 
the pilot to concentrate on a small subset of the total information and 
controls available when a failure occurs.
However, IIPACS often leaves critical decisions up to the pilot. 
For example, during takeoff the pilot must recognize an engine failure 
prior to reaching the single engine control speed (VI), although the 
designers of IIPACS considered the alternative of letting the system do 
the recognizing. Thus, if the pilot detects an engine out situation prior 
to VI, he must press an abort switch which will automatically initiate abort 
procedures, such as actuating the thrust reversers and wheel brakes.
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2.5.4. Critique
2.5.4.1. Improvements Over Conventional System
The IIPACS document provides an extensive top-down analysis of 
the various failures and the procedures for correcting them. As an 
example of top-down organization, under the general heading of "Landing 
Gear Failure" there appear various subheadings such as "During Takeoff" 
or "During Landing." At the lowest levels are the detection and correction 
tasks necessary to cope with these failures. Some of these tasks are 
assigned to man, while other to machine (the IIPACS computer system).
The old problem of pilot fixation is also lessened somewhat.
For example, if the pilot is performing a routine maneuver while monitoring 
one of his displays, any emergency situation automatically detected by 
IIPACS causes some displays to change, hopefully getting the pilots 
attention.
2.5.4.2. Areas of No-Change
The IIPACS philosophy is that the pilot is responsible for 
detecting most failures from audio and visual input or from the "feel 
of the plane." To an experienced pilot an engine failure has certain 
characteristics such as a decrease in noise level in the cockpit or lack 
of thrust. Whenever the pilot detects a failure, he is expected to look 
at the display panels for indications of failure, and push the appropriate 
buttons to initiate corrective procedures.
The pilot's workload is only superficially decreased, for during 
a high workload period he still must make decisions imposed upon him by 
the lack of flexibility and the lack of automatic failure detection. As
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an example, suppose an emergency occurs which the pilot still must detect. 
He may be concentrating on some other flight aspect (such as getting the 
landing gear down). In doing so, his attention may be fixed on the display 
showing the gear's position.
The chief criticism is that the IIPACS study does not supply a 
good way of automatically detecting and identifying specific failures.
Hence one cannot fully utilize the failure mode operations described in the 
IIPACS document.
2.5.4.3. Drawbacks of the IIPACS System
Pilots who were trained on conventional equipment may find it 
more difficult to fly an IIPACS equipped aircraft than those who were 
not; emergency procedures often call for an immediate conditioned response 
quite different from that expected in a conventional airplane.
2.5.5. Guide to Future Actions
The IIPACS system does not cope adequately with the problem of 
multiple failures, and the system still requires the pilot to do much of 
the failure detection. Both of these problems can be attacked by a system 
which uses bottom-up analysis for failure detection. A flow chart 
embodying this kind of analysis begins with the basic sensors and then 
works up, describing the various deductions that may be made based on 
these sensors. These deductions are then combined to make still higher 
level deduction until the system identifies failures which can trigger 
top-down correction procedures. With this approach, techniques for 
automatically handling multiple failures can be developed.
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It is true that such a bottom-up analysis appears to be extremely 
difficult to write, let alone implement. Furthermore, the number of deduc­
tions will combinatorially increase if one considers a "reasonable" 
number of multiple failures. It is precisely in cases like this where 
concepts of artificial intelligence are relevant. The balance of this 
section will give examples of how an intelligent airborne computer system 
would function. In principle, this computer will monitor the sensors 
and then employ the data obtained from the sensors to detect one or more 
failures.
Let us show how the workload can be shifted from the pilot to 
a computer. A computer can monitor the various sensors and then perform 
"intelligent" deductions. For instance, a rapid increase in temperature 
and pressure (thus implying a rapid decrease in elevation) indicates a 
diving situation, whereas drastic changes in G-force may indicate evasive 
maneuvers and an intelligent system could deduce that these situations 
existed. Since the computer can monitor the various sensors much faster 
than a man can, it can perform high workload tasks such as coping with 
multiple failures.
Naturally, in an ideal system the pilot should be informed of 
any failure whenever practical and should, whenever possible, be permitted 
to take any corrective action. The system should not make any key decisions 
on its own unless the pilot is already involved in some high workload 
function such as takeoff maneuvering or responding to another, more 
critical, failure. The various airplane components (engine, control 
surfaces, instruments, etc.) can be assigned priority numbers in the
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sense that a higher number would be assigned in the more critical cases 
where the pilot should be informed so he can take action. Thus, failure 
of less critical components occurring at the same time as an engine fire 
could be handled automatically and then reported back to the pilot as 
soon as he responded to the fire.
An intelligent system can provide greater effective redundancy. 
For example, a computer can detect failure of one altitude reporting 
device if it does not conform within the range predicted by two or more 
other such devices or their past histories, even though the devices 
may be quite dissimilar in concept and operation (examples: barometric and
radar altimeters). As another example, an airplane component such as an 
engine or aileron may fail; in such a case, abnormal behavior in most of 
the instruments monitoring the engine or aileron could cause the computer 
to recognize the situation.
There are other ways in which the man-machine interaction can 
be improved. First, the pilot should be able to report any pilot-detected 
failures in components to the computer system; reporting these failures 
would then help the system do a better job in monitoring the remaining 
components that still work. Second, certain very critical decision 
points during a flight, such as reaching the minimum single-engine 
control speed, should be reported to the pilot at all times during takeoff 
runs. This would help the pilot make better decisions in the event of 
trouble, or make them in a shorter amount of time.
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2.6. Weapon Delivery
2.6.1. Introduction
Weapon delivery is probably the single most important function 
performed by the fighter aircraft. In order to insure the destruction of 
the target the aircraft must have the capability of supporting a large 
number of weapons of widely differing types and characteristics. The 
aircraft system must be able to select arming, fusing, and delivery 
options for each of the many weapons on board. Some of the weapons are 
unguided and the weapon impact point is determined by the aircraft 
trajectory at the time of release. Other weapons are guided but the 
aircraft trajectory must be controlled so that the weapon can acquire 
and lock on to its target before release. As a result, during weapon 
delivery, the flight path of the aircraft must be precisely controlled 
to insure that the weapon will impact the desired target. To accomplish 
this the aircraft system must accurately know its own position and 
velocity relative to the target and must be able to calculate the trajectory 
the weapon will follow. This implies strong coupling between the flight 
control system, navigation system, energy management system, target 
acquisition sensors, and routines to calculate trajectories. In Addition 
to normal release of weapons the aircraft must be able to safely jettison 
weapons in an emergency.
2.6.2. What is Provided by IIPACS
The stores management provides integrated selection, control, 
monitoring, and release of all weapons as well as interfacing with the 
rest of the avionics system. This is accomplished by use of a master
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keyboard which is shared with all other avionics functions, the 
stores/gun select panel which is dedicated to weapons control, a multi­
purpose display, and an emergency jettison button.
A logic plug is installed at the stores/aircraft interface by 
the weapons mechanic when the store is loaded. This logic plug supplies 
the computer with information describing the type and location of all 
weapons onboard. This information is displayed on the lighted switches 
on the stores/gun select panel. Arming, fusing, and delivery options 
are presented on the MPD and are selected through the master keyboard.
2.6.3. Critique of IIPACS
Preparation of a weapon for delivery requires extensive inter­
action between the pilot and the aircraft system. The pilot must first 
press the weapon management button to configure the master keyboard for 
stores management. The stores select panel displays the type and status 
of each remaining weapon. The pilot presses one or more buttons on the 
stores select panel to select weapons based on his knowledge of the target. 
The MPD displays the fusing, sequencing and delivery options for the 
selected weapon. The pilot selects the desired options using the master 
keyboard, and the lights on the stores select panel display the selected 
options. Before release the weapon must be armed using the master arm 
switch.
To attempt to reduce the workload on the pilot during a combat 
situation the aircraft system might be allowed to perform the selection 
tasks. The sequence of events would be as follows: the pilot would
designate a target on the horizontal or vertical situation displays.
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The system would lock onto the target and examine radar, optical, and 
infrared data about the target. Based on the relative strengths of the 
radar, optical, and infrared signals and the altitude, range and relative 
velocity of the target, the system would select the optimum weapon and 
options from the remaining stores and display the selection to the pilot.
The pilot would approve or disapprove the selection. If disapproved the 
pilot would have to ask for the second choice of weapons or select the 
weapon and options himself. If approved the pilot would only have to arm 
the weapon before release. In this way the number of interactions between 
the pilot and the system is reduced.
2.7. Genera 1 Comments
2.7.1. Computer System
One problem common to all the current avionics packages is the 
lack of a functionally centralized computer facility. This central system 
should provide:
a) A hardware communication route between every computing unit
and every transducer and activator. It may appear obvious, but it must 
be noted nevertheless that there is nothing to talk about if the hardware 
link does not exist. This means, as the IMS study has realized, that 
while many CPUs may be used, each one should be able to perform any critical 
function. For example, in the IMS system the computing task of the radar system 
may be done in the central CPUs rather than the specialized radar computer if 
necessary. '
b) A software systems that' isondt idesigned in a "separate box" 
fashion as much of IIPACS/IMS is; While'-the .separate box approactrdoeso 
make writing of each subroutine easier, the resulting system is much too
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inflexible. In an intelligent system, each function must be able to 
communicate at a high level with other functions, and have some model of 
what the other functions do. For many tasks it is not possible to do 
straight line coding to test for all possibilities, instead one must 
operate with a continuously changing global model of what a function is 
required to do.
Another area where greater sophistication is needed is in 
computer handling of failures -- a situation of high pilot workload.
It seems possible to go further than IIPACS has in the automatic handling 
of failures. In many cases, IIPACS gets as far as warning the pilot of 
the failure and perhaps presenting him with a list of actions, but it 
does not carry out the actions. In the IIPACS system there are several 
possible reasons why this is true:
1) Thke computer cannot decide which of several actions to take 
because it is inadequately programmed.
2) It cannot decide because some of the information necessary 
to make a decision can only be obtained by transfer through 
the pilot.
3) The actions to take are clear but there is no way to initiate 
the actions.
/
4) It is felt the pilot must okay the actions.
There is also the further problem, not well treated in IIPACS, of multiple 
failures. It is clear that a simple fixed priority scheme is insufficient. 
Which failure is the most important will heavily depend on the current
situation,
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We feel that what has always been missing from avionics software 
is a good operating system. It is not easy to design a system that allows 
fast and easy access to system resources by many requesting sources, and 
is also able to lock out some requesters when necessary. This is not 
simple timesharing, due to the importance of hardware and software failures. 
It is necessary to be able to recognize when some module has gone beserk 
and ignore it. In situations where several sources of the same information 
are available, the module requesting information should have some idea of 
what failures are likely and which source is more reliable.
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To illustrate how far there is to go in the design of airborne
operating systems, consider the following description of current systems:
Most present airborne computers use a main program to connect 
and to sequence the execution of programs. The main program 
is a loop with a fixed sequence of execution for the programs, 
even though the execution of any given program may consist 
of only a test which causes the rest of the program to be 
skipped. Most of the major branching resulting from program 
tests is determined by the pilot or navigator who uses panel 
switches to select equipment, modes, or functions he wishes 
to use. While the computer may calculate some of its own 
branching, and while abrupt branching may occur as the result 
of hardware interrupts, most of the main program task is to 
loop through the computer programs in a sequence set by the 
pilot or navigator. The main program loop is designed to meet 
the computational speed requirements of each computer function 
in the worst case (heaviest computer loading) although the 
computer often will not be executing the worst case.
The IMS study then goes on to describe their proposed operating
system. It breaks the mission up into "events" and the computing jobs
into "tasks" which are run when called by individual task monitors. While
the IMS operating system (IMSOS) is a good step forward, it still contains
features which will make it difficult for programs running under it to
interact freely.
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In both the IIPACS and IMS studies, it was found necessary to
explicitly "segmentize" the mission within the computer. This makes program
sequencing easier, but also forces the consideration of failures to be
a detached, special case. The following quote cites a typical problem
this segmentizing can introduce:
The basis for the IMSOS scheduling is a preflight mission 
plan that is revisable enroute. It is believed that the 
problem of the computer's becoming "lost" in following the 
mission plan can be minimized by special enroute programmed 
checks, at worst, a temporary degradation to manual mode 
would occur.
2.7.2. Pilot Workload
This is some indication that the information displayed to 
pilot in the IIPACS system can be so prolific that it could be very 
difficult to use. Two quotes from IIPACS study, Vol. 1, Appendix III, 
page 123, the section listing the evaluations given about the IIPACS 
mock-up cockpit by veteran military pilots, support this contention:
I am afraid that the amount of information being 
displayed is too much. If this amount of information 
is required, then we need another seat in this airplane*
(The IIPACS displays) may be too distracting to
be of useful value. (They) display too much information?
The only viable solution to the information "explosion" problem is to
display less information. To do this without degrading the pilot/
aircraft system it is necessary for intelligent avionics software to
order this information for pilot attention according to a dynamic priority
scheme that gives the pilot exactly what he needs when he needs it and
acts on much of the data by itself. This type of software can be arrived
at only interrelating each system module into cooperating processes,
and giving the system some ability and responsibility for decision-making.
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3. GENERAL APPRAISAL:,AND SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT
3.1. Introduction
This section presents a number of important ideas. It is 
divided into three sections:
3.2. A summary of the main improvements and main difficulties
in the IIPACS/lMS systems with respect to pilot work­
load;
3.3. A similar assessment with respect to system reliability
and safety; and
3.4. Specific suggestions for improvement of these systems. 
This section refers roughly to the situation where the IIPACS
system is added to a single-man aircraft. If the IIPACS system replaces 
one man in a two-man aircraft, then the shortcomings become more serious.
3.2. Pilot Workload with IIPACS/IMS
3.2.1. Improvements in Pilot Workload
(1) The IIPACS system Autopilot will allow the pilot to select 
more modes than currently available in aircraft. These modes should 
increase the level of aircraft performance given the same amount of pilot 
workload, or reduce the required pilot workload to achieve the same level 
of aircraft performance. In addition, some stability augmentation is 
always done by the system, which will reduce pilot workload.
(2) The guidance system should also offer the same type of 
improvement, i.e. increased performance given the same workload, or 
decreased workload to achieve the same performance level.
(3) Some kinds of data will be presented in a more useable or 
concise form. Thus the pilot will not have to do calculations in his
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head given the raw data, but can get the computed data directly. Similarly, 
the pilot should not have to perform as many comparisons with memorized 
numbers, but should be more easily able to obtain the results of such 
comparisons directly.
(4) The pilot will be able to be a little less involved in 
his instruments, since certain problem situations will be automatically 
detected by the system and brought to his attention. The decrease in 
workload will be fairly small, however, since most failures still must 
be detected by the pilot, and more seriously, the system in general does 
not warn of impeding problems but only of problems that already exist.
Thus the pilot must still monitor the instruments to about the same 
degree as in conventional aircraft.
3.2.2. Negative Changes in Pilot Workload
(1) In cases inhere the pilot has to read text from a screen 
(i.e. in order to read an emergency procedure or other stored information) 
his workload will be higher than if he had memorized the information.
While text is a very general way of presenting data, such data takes much 
longer to grasp than does graphic data.
(2) If the pilot wishes to know information that is not 
currently displayed, he must key in the request, whereas in conventional 
aircraft the information is always directly available and the pilot need 
only remember where to look.
(3) In a conventional aircraft, the pilot knows the meaning 
of each instrument from its position. In the IIPACS system, he must 
either read some text or recognize by shape which information is being
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displayed. It probably will be difficult to avoid having some displays 
look quite similar.
(4) All these workload problems will be especially acute for 
a pilot trained originally on aircraft not equipped with IIPACS. Such a 
pilot must modify his old reactions and routines, and thus may spend more 
time deciding what to do. Given the fact that workload decreases are 
modest at best, such a pilot might in fact end up with a higher workload.
3.2.3. Areas with Little or No change in Workload
(1) Unfortunately the IIPACS system improvements in workload 
seem to apply almost exclusively to the situations where workload was low 
anyhow. Virtually nothing has been done to relieve the pilot during 
emergencies, take-offs and landings, or combat maneuvers.
(2) The pilot must still implement all decisions and most 
controls that he does in a conventional aircraft. The designers of the 
IIPACS system apparently did not trust a computer to take over even the 
most routine decision making functions of the pilot.
(3) Much of the failure detection, especially of impending 
failures, must still be done by the pilot, and once a failure is detected,
v
the pilot must cope with the situation by himself.
3.3. System Reliability and Safety
3.3.1. Improvements in Reliability and Safety
(1) The possibility of a pilot being unaware of certain 
emergency situations is considerably lessened. Any problems identified 
by the system are signalled by changes in the main displays, so there 
is little chance that the pilot will fail to become aware of such problems.
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(2) Since emergency procedures can be displayed by the system, 
there is less chance that the pilot will act incorrectly.
(3) Automatic stability augmentation should prevent certain 
emergencies, for example a situation where the pilot cannot perform a 
desired maneuver because his center of gravity is badly placed.
(4) The accuracy of the aircraft guidance system should improve, 
and its reliability should be greater.
(5) The ability to optimize some flight paths should give the 
aircraft a distinct performance edge over conventional aircraft whenever 
such optimization is possible. Obviously this can mean that the pilot 
in an IIPACS equipped aircraft will survive in some cases where a pilot 
in a conventional aircraft would not.
3.3.2. Decreases in Aircraft Reliability and Safety
(1) In an emergency the pilot must perform virtually all the 
functions he does in a conventional aircraft, but he must perform them 
in a different manner. For a pilot trained on a conventional plane, this 
could be a serious safety hazard, since the pilot’s basic emergency 
reactions must be changed. Of course, in some sense this is a problem 
whenever any change is made in a man-machine system.
(2) There should be a set of conventional instruments available 
to allow flight even if the display system should fail. (This omission 
has been corrected in the DAIS system).
(3) It is possible that in the IIPACS aircraft, a pilot might 
fail to detect a faulty sensor that he might have noticed in a conventional 
aircraft due to abnormal or erratic instrument motion.
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(4) There may be some danger in a pilot's reliance on situation 
displays that are not updated in real time. According to all the informa­
tion we could find, some IIPACS displays will not be updated in real time. 
One specific example is the energy management display which will not be 
realtime during air-to-air combat or landing maneuvers. (see page 111, 
volume 4).
(5) In our estimation, the IIPACS feature which changes the 
loop gain between the control stick and control surfaces should not be 
implemented as described. As far as we can tell from*the IIPACS manuals, 
the system eliminates all tactile feedback, which in conventional aircraft 
provides indispensible indications about dangerous situations such as 
impeding stall or excessive G-loading. The amount of feedback could be 
varied by the pilot, but he should have some choice in the matter.
3.3.3. Areas of No Change in Safety or Reliability
(1) While the systems described will not allow an emergency 
to go unnoticed, in general they do not help very much in avoiding the 
emergency situation to begin with. Since all corrective control actions 
must be by the pilot, the IIPACS designers realized that it would be 
dangerously distracting to sound alarms or switch displays whenever a 
parameter gets close to a danger area. As long as the pilot is tied to 
the equivalent of a conventional instrument scan, the system's threshold 
of sensitivity to danger cannot be set very low.
(2) Once the system has notified the pilot of an emergency 
situation, it does very little more to alleviate the pilot's workload or 
to help correct the emergency.
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(3) Significantly, the data displayed to the pilot is no 
more reliable than in a conventional aircraft. It is easy to design a 
computer system with redundant sensors and display the majority decision. 
This is not possible in a conventional plane since there is not space for 
three instruments of each type, and no way for the pilot to monitor three 
sets of instruments. We mention this as one of a number of fairly obvious 
additions one would expect on an aircraft with an on-board computer.
3.4. Specific Suggestions for Improvements at the IIPACS/IMS 
Level of Automation
3.4.1. Display Priorities
A more intelligent system should be included to run the display.
In particular the system should have provisions for multiple failures with 
prearranged priorities so that the most critical failure is guaranteed to 
be displayed. Such a system requires more computer power, but should not 
be too difficult technically to implement.
3.4.2. Display Content
It is inadequate to only display failures and emergency situations 
after they have occurred. Impending emergencies should be displayed in 
time to allow corrective action. As we have noted, however, the pilot 
already suffers from information overload. In cases where the pilot reads 
a procedure from the screen and implements it without further decisions, 
he should be taken out of the control loop totally. We feel that there 
is no need for the pilot to perform tasks of this nature. Some examples 
of such tasks include emergency procedures, so that this change should 
help specifically in high workload situations.
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3.4.3. Emergency Mode
There should be a pilot selectable mode in which the computer 
system will perform as many operations as it can without the pilot's aid.
The system may not perform these functions as well as the pilot could, but 
in situations such as air-to-air combat or multiple emergencies, the pilot 
may wish to direct as much attention as possible to his specific problems.
In such cases the choice may be between suboptimal automatic system action 
and no action at all, and obviously, the former is preferable.
3.4.4. Instruments
Enough conventional instruments should be available to allow the 
pilot to fly the aircraft even if all displays should fail.
3.4.5. Automatic Control Gain Changes
The gain and thus the "feel" of the controls should not change 
except when the pilot specifically requests such change, or when he abdicates 
his right to know about such changes.
3.4.6. Mode Select
Using current technology, it is possible to have the pilot select 
a particular point in the energy envelope at which to operate, using a 
light pen or touch display to indicate the desired operating point. The 
IIPACS system now offers only modes on the envelope extremes: maximum
range, minimum fuel, maximum rate climb, etc.
3.4.7. Real Time Display Updates
A number of techniques can be brought to bear on this problem.
One example is prestoring of information combined with table look-up. 
Techniques like hash-coding and interpolation should allow real time updates
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of any flight information, given adequate amounts of memory. One of the 
prime results of early computer work was the demonstration that there is 
a direct memory size/process speed tradeoff.
3.4.8. Failure Prediction, Detection, and Connection
(1) While it is not possible to have a fully reliable system 
for failure detection and prediction within IIPACS, much more could be 
done than the designers have suggested. Small processors could be 
dedicated to cross-checking system readings and calculations, looking for 
parameters that are approaching envelope limits, and other tasks. Some 
care should be taken to choose tasks for these processors which have the 
greatest effect on relieving the pilot during high workload periods.
(2) Whenever the corrective procedure for a failure is straight­
forward, the pilot should be relieved of responsibility for performing that 
procedure. An effort should be made to avoid having pilot tasks which 
involve reading an instruction from the display screen and mechanically 
carrying it out.
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4. ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF A FULLY AUTOMATED SYSTEM 
AND THE IMPORTANCE OF PROGRAM INTELLIGENCE
4.1. Description of Essential Characteristics of a Fully 
Automated System
As should be clear by now, there are many possible levels of 
automation. For instance, for all practical purposes the cruise phase 
of a mission is already automated to a high degree, at least as long as 
there are no contingencies. Moreover, even in an aircraft that can fly 
itself automatically, there are still levels of automation. We can 
imagine a marginally adequate system or a very reliable one. Thus we 
must not only consider how much of a system is automated, but how well 
that system is automated. As long as a man-machine system performs 
better than a machine only system, the man will of course remain in the 
control loop during normal circumstances. But during emergencies there 
would be great value in having a machine which can be asked to perform 
certain operations independently, even if it does not perform as well 
as the man-machine system, since these operations may otherwise not be 
performed at all.
The system described in this section is intended to be a 
realistic assessment of what could be done in the long run through the 
application of ideas and concepts from the fields of artificial intelligence 
and conventional automation. How fast such systems could be realized and 
how good they would be depends on the degree of funding, the speed at 
which avionics computers of adequate size become available, pilot acceptance 
of these systems, and many other factors, including of course the accuracy 
of our assessment and predication of the situation.
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A system which realized even a few of these ideas could be used:
(1) to augment the performance and reliability of a single-man aircraft,
(2) supply enough functional assistance so that only a single man is 
required in a normally two-man aircraft at no expense in performance,
(3) to make a trainer aircraft safer or (4) to improve the operation of 
an RPV.
With this preface, we will proceed with the description of a 
fully automated system:
(1) First and foremost this system will be designed to be 
able to fly by itself if the pilot requests it to do so, or if the pilot 
is unable to fly himself. The system will contain provisions for 
detecting when the pilot has relinquished control. The minimal system 
will fly directly to a base if the pilot is no longer functioning, 
avoiding obstacles and weather systems on the way. The system thus will 
consider the pilot as a component which may also be disabled; however 
pilot disability will not mean total system failure.
(2) The system will be flexible; it will allow the pilot to 
do whatever portion of the flying he wishes to do, with the exception 
that it will not allow him to apply controls that would lead to a crash, 
stall or other emergency situation unless the pilot first notifies the 
system that he wishes to be able to exceed the normal safety envelopes 
(we include obstacles as part of the envelope). There could be several 
levels of risk the pilot could choose to operate within. If he activates 
the most dangerous mode, the system would not intervene in any circumstances 
at the most conservative level, the system would keep all instruments
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within safety areas. Such safety envelopes can be set to allow performance 
much closer to the true time limits of the plane's potential than is 
possible when the pilot keeps certain instrument limits in mind as he 
scans. These scan limits must be conservative in order to keep a reasonable 
safety margin, whereas a computer system can devote sufficient attention 
to the aircraft state to allow much closer approaches to the actual limits.
A system like this would also be invaluable for trainer aircraft. A 
trainee could be started in the lowest risk mode, and as he become more 
proficient could move to modes of greater risk.
(3) Because the aircraft's computer system will not allow the 
aircraft to crash, stall, etc. except in the highest risk mode, the pilot 
will be freed from doing an instrument scan, and thus can concentrate
on any aspect of flight he chooses. When he approaches system bounds or 
when emergencies occur, the system will produce a set of options and give 
the pilot an audio signal or recorded message. In many instances a 
recorded message could request a yes/no decision or selection of one 
of several options. If the number of options were small enough, the 
pilot could designate his choice verbally, or at worst by pressing one 
of several multipurpose buttons. Thus in these cases his workload could 
by drastically reduced, since his eyes and hands would for the most part 
be free to continue with other tasks (we are aware of the difficulties 
of speech recognition in a noisy cockpit environment).
(4) Another reduction in the pilot's scanning workload is 
achieved by having zero pressure on the control stick represent tactilit^y 
to the pilot the case where the system is achieving the currently specified 
system goal (either prestored or keyed in). If the pilot must apply
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pressure to respond to an emergency (i.e. to avoid a missile) then he 
will have direct feedback that he is deviating from the flight plan, 
without having to consult his instruments, thus leaving his eyes free 
to aid in guiding the aircraft. The system could of course return to 
its goal after such maneuvers. The system will be able to detect failures 
and reconfigure itself to continue flight without pilot involvement up to 
the point where it is no longer possible to continue the flight plan 
unmodified. At this point the system will give the pilot options. The 
system will notify the pilot of each failure it detects, and will accept 
and act on information and pilot-detected failures. In light workload 
phases of flight, the pilot could take part in the reconfiguration if he 
wished.
(5) System goals are at a higher level than are goals in a 
current system. Thus for example if the pilot has specified that he 
wishes to go to a particular set of coordinates, the system will be able 
to return to that goal after the pilot has executed emergency evasive 
maneuvers, or flown around a weather system. In contrast, a lower level 
goal is one like "hold heading" or "hold altitude." If these are the 
only available modes, then the pilot must recalculate and begin a new 
heading, a new climb rate, etc. after executing an unexpected deviation 
from a flight plan.
(6) The plane can respond to instructions from the ground or 
from another plane, since it will be able to accept high level commands 
such as "fly from here to point A." Probably it would only accept commands 
from the ground if the pilot had already relinquished control.
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(7) The system will be able to land and take off automatically, 
even in degraded modes. The model of the aircraft used by the system to 
predict responses to controls must thus be flexible enough to represent 
any conceivable state of the aircraft, and there must be systems capable 
of adapting the model to the actual aircraft state.
4.2. Relevant Concepts of Program Intelligence
Embedded in the previous section are a number of system capabilities 
which can only be realized by an "intelligent system." By an "intelligent 
system" we mean one which is able to adapt and respond to the current 
situation, one which is able to make predictions and decisions within 
its universe, one which can accept and provide high level information to 
a user, and one which can remember important information. An intelligent 
system is thus intelligent with respect to its domain, and not necessarily 
intelligent in a general sense, as a human being is intelligent.
The field of artificial intelligence has endeavored to understand 
what is necessary to produce such systems. In the process, a number 
of concepts have emerged which have proved useful in designing intelligent 
systems. We will describe a number of the most important concepts below.
4.2.1. System Organization
In order to exhibit intelligence, a system must be organized in 
an appropriate manner.
(a) The system organization must be an integrated whole; a 
system made up of a number of independent boxes will not be capable of 
intelligent action. For example, it is not sufficient to monitor individual
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instruments in order to decide whether an emergency exists. While some 
emergencies can be detected in such a manner, many can only be recognized 
by a system able to detect a dangerous combination of readings, no single 
one of which may exceed a limit by itself. For another example, many 
emergencies are detectable only if one can recognize the failure of the 
aircraft to respond appropriately to control inputs. In order to detect 
such situations it is also necessary to have a model which predicts proper 
instrument responses and compares these values with the actual responses. 
(Individual boxes which can all communicate with each other effectively 
comprise an integrated system; a system with a central monitor and a 
number of peripheral subsystems also qualifies.)
(b) The system must be heterarchical, in order to identify 
the nature of an already detected emergency situation. It is necessary 
for a system to examine various parameters for evidence concerning the 
identity of the problem system or systems. As an example, an emergency 
situation where the aircraft is losing altitude very rapidly may be caused 
by a number of different subsystem failures, and it is necessary to 
check other data to determine which subsystem is responsible. A heterarchical 
system is one organized so that information flows both from lower levels 
(e.g. instruments) to higher levels (i.e. emergency detection routines) 
and from higher levels back to lower levels, as well as laterally between 
subsystems at the same level.
A heterarchical system is necessary in order to automatically 
realize pilot protocols.
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(c) The system must be organized on an interrupt basis. By this 
we mean that the system cannot operate by running over and over a 
cyclic list of tests and instructions. Such a system can become fixated 
on some portion of its processing and not get to a portion of the cycle 
where an emergency is detected until too late. There must be parallel 
subsystems capable of gaining the attention of a central processor on a 
priority interrupt basis.
4.2.2. Procedural Knowledge
One key problem attacked by artificial intelligence is the problem 
of representing dynamic knowledge. Computers have been used from their 
beginnings to store numbers as data with programs to operate on the data; 
this type of data is static and numerical. In artificial intelligence we 
now are working with concepts that allow programs to operate on and utilize 
procedural knowledge as data. This means that decision procedures, test 
procedures, display procedures, etc. can all be stored as if they were 
data, and can be retrieved, modified and interpreted by other programs.
All natural language programs of the past few years have been based primarily 
on these ideas.
4.2.3. The Representation Problem
The representation problem is the problem of finding just what 
form procedural data must have in order to be able to effectively store 
all the knowledge necessary to specify a procedure. The problem has three 
parts: (1) One must pick a form of representation, e.g. a language in 
which the knowledge can be expressed: (2) The knowledge must be organized in 
such a way that it is accessible; and (3) One must make sure that there
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is sufficient knowledge to adequately specify the procedures.
The process involved in solving the representation problem is 
often referred to as modelling.
The core of a fully automated system is a procedural model of 
a pilot. In order to construct such a model one needs a great deal of 
information about the factors a pilot takes into consideration in making 
decisions: deciding when a situation is out of the ordinary, deciding how
to proceed in pinpointing the nature of problems, deciding the best course 
of action in a given situation, and so on.
One cannot get enough information to construct such a model from 
pilot manuals alone, since manuals assume that any person using the manual 
also has "common sense," manual skills, the ability to look at and under­
stand the world around him, and numerous other abilities. Thus in order 
to use the knowledge in the manuals these abilities must be added to the 
system in an appropriate procedural form or through alternative substitutes, 
or else the system must take into account throughout an inherent lack of 
certain pilot abilities.
4.2.4. Automatic Programming
It has been usually true in the past that the major part of 
creating any intelligent system is deciding on the representations to be 
used by the system. Once representations have been chosen, writing software 
to generate, modify, and utilize these representations has proved relatively 
easy. Much current research is focused on finding means to make the choice 
of representations easier. Such research is a portion of the field called 
automatic programming; one basic idea is to set up a representation which
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can then be modified by the user with a small number of commands. The 
system automatically generates modifications to the representation to 
reflect all the consequences of the modification.
At another level of sophistication, there is research on programs 
which write programs according to certain specifications. While such 
research is still in its beginning phases, it holds the promise of providing 
techniques far more powerful than those we have today for writing complex 
programs. Conceivably such programs could be directed by English language 
commands and could interact with a user, e.g. by asking for additional 
specifications or information.
4.3. A Possible Configuration Eor a Fully Automated System
Figure 7 gives an overall view of an automated system, showing 
how the computer will interact with the remaining components. Except for 
the "computer system" box, these components are the standard ones currently 
used in aircraft, although some modifications are expected (such as the 
IIPACS displays).
Figure 8 gives a more detailed block diagram of the "computer 
system" box itself (within the dashed lines). The data bank consists 
of a common memory module available to all of the central processing 
units (CPU's). In it, various aircraft capabilities and flight character­
istics are stored. This bank includes a set of aircraft models which can 
be used to predict the flight path for the next few minutes. These models 
can take into account the fact that not all aircraft subsystems (such as 
engines, ailerons, etc.) may be functional. Also included in the data 
bank are terrain and map data, energy management tables, various correction
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Figure 7 Automated System Block Diagram
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Figure 8. Detailed Diagram of the Computer System Box 
of Figure 7. All boxes within the dashed 
lines have access to the data bank.
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procedures, and other miscellaneous software.
This data remains constant throughout a flight- To provide 
additional reliability, it is to be designated as "read-only", which 
means that accidental erasures cannot occur. The data bank also contains 
variable data such as the current flight parameters. These include 
indications of the current status of the engines and instruments, the 
attitude of the aircraft, the amount of remaining fuel, current fuel 
consumption rate, and the various operating modes selected by the pilot.
The remaining modules are the various CPU's in the system.
Each CPU has its own private memory bank to guarantee fast access to its
own programs and variables. The dedicated monitors perform low-level
\
analyses (and resulting deductions) of the sensor data from pressure 
gauges, fuel-flow meters, wing deicers, combustion temperatures, etc.
As an example, one monitor may be dedicated to an engine; it "reads" 
the sensor data pertaining to that engine and then draws possible 
conclusions, e.g. everything is O.K., one gauge is malfunctioning, or the 
engine is on fire.
Emergencies detected by the monitors described above will 
interrupt the emergency monitor. This module has the task of coordinating 
the various failures that may occur; it maintains a priority scheme to 
assist it in case of multiple failures.
The envelope slave computes the flight envelopes and checks to 
determine whether the current flight path will remain within them. Any 
"out of envelope" conditions will cause an alarm interrupt of the main 
CPU (scheduler) so that corrective action can be taken. By "envelope"
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we mean an extended envelope which also includes the ground and weather 
systems as constraints on the current flight path.
The Autopilot driver is actually a higher-level Autopilot. It 
has deductive capabilities, so that it can translate a high-level command 
like "perform a thirty-degree coordinated turn to the right" into the 
lower-level commands which it transmits to the Autopilot. In doing so, 
it takes into consideration the current state of the aircraft (an engine 
or rudder may be malfunctioning).
The avionics slave not only encodes (decodes) messages transmitted 
to (received from) the various avionics, but it also supplies control 
signals to change frequencies, select transponder modes, turn the VOR dial, 
etc. The displays and control panels are manipulated in very much the 
same manner by the display and control slave.
It is the scheduler's job to coordinate the other modules. In 
doing so, it will frequently perform rather sophisticated high-level 
deductions. As an example, suppose the pilot is just about to exceed 
the flight envelope. The envelope slave, upon detecting this condition, 
alarms the scheduler which must in turn notify both the autopilot driver 
and the display module. Before doing so, the scheduler must first determine 
the proper maneuver the airplane must take; this is done by examining the 
data bank along with parameters received from the other modules.
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5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
5.1. Possible Trends in Advanced Automation for Flight Operations
5.1.1. Introduction
In the following sections we shall attempt to predict some 
possible trends in advanced automation for flight operations. Although 
these are nothing but educated guesses they do present a reasonable 
picture given our knowledge of the present state of the art of automation 
in aviation and current trends in computer research. The periods identified 
are operational periods. To obtain development periods subtract 5 from the 
years. To obtain research periods subtract 10. For example, if according 
to our prediction, automatic energy management will be operational during 
the period 1985-1990, development should occur during the years 1980-1985 
and research should occur during the years no later than 1975-1980.
In general, tasks in flight operations are highly interrelated,
(See Fig. 9) although we shall attempt in the following to identify 
individual tasks for emphasis. Any workable program may involve at least 
several items on the list.
5.1.2. 1975-1980: The IIPACS/lMS Years
During this period many of the concepts contained in IIPACS/
IMS will be made operational. The pilot will enjoy an information manage­
ment system and will probably have some form of time-shared display. Some 
improvements on man-machine communication will take place. These improvements 
will make IIPACS/lMS more practical and acceptable to most pilots. Situations 
will still be difficult during high workload periods. The two-man fighter 
will still outperform the one-man fighter in most instances.
Landing__________
Energy Management
Communications
Navigation
Auto Pilot
Take Off
Fuel Management
Weather Avoidance
Weapon Delivery
Auto Return to Base
Preflight Planning
Preflight Check
Component Reliability Stat. 
Degraded Mode-Airframe
Degraded Mode-Instruments 
Failure Detection
Figure 9. Relationship Between Automated Functions
A dot indicates direct interrelation between 
areas.
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5.1.3. 1980-1985: Years of Intelligent Routines
Key concepts during this period will be:
1. Data Base for Flight History, etc.
2. Pre-Flight Planning and Post-Flight Analysis
3. Extended Navigation, Obstacle Avoidance, and
Dynamic Rerouting
4. Automatic Returns to Base
(Under favorable conditions)
5. Pseudo-Natural Language Communication
6. System Fault Diagnosis
First to emerge, due primarily to LSI technology, will be large 
data bases built out of compact and high-density semiconductor memories.
These data bases will be the Stepping stones to the automatic and routine 
recording and analysis of flight histories for various purposes including 
preventive maintenance. Automatic systems can then be built to do pre-flight 
planning and post-flight analyses. Dynamic rerouting routines can be constructed 
to avoid obstacles during flight. Coupled with suitable nav aids much of 
cruising is completely automated. Due to the lack of an accurate pattern 
recognition capability, the system has to be informed of the potential presence 
and location of obstacles. Toward the end of this period systems can be 
constructed for automatic return to base, under favorable conditions. Thus 
cruising becomes completely routine. Take off and landing are automatically 
done during most circumstances.
At the same time systems with pseudo-natural language capability are 
constructed so the pilot does not have to learn computer jargons anymore.
In addition, automatic diagnostic routines will be developed for fault
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isolation and location. Also developed will be automatic recovery routines.
Everything that is mentioned here is within the state of the 
art. We have the computer know-how to accomplish all these tasks. What 
needs to be done is a development program to perfect the techniques and 
design the systems. No new breakthrough in research is required.
5.1.4. 1985-1990: The Emergence of Baseline Intelligent Systems
Key concepts during this period will be:
7. Automatic Failure Detection and Prediction
8. Automatic Degraded Mode Operation
9. Automatic Energy Management
10. Obstacle Avoidance with Recognition
11. Intelligent Man-Machine, Machine-Machine Communication
(Including natural language, but no speech)
Tasks listed here are feasible in principle. The present research 
frontier has touched upon many similar questions. Yet due to lack of 
detailed understanding and development they remain in the gray region of 
semi-unknown. Given a concerted effect success is almost guaranteed.
Automatic failure detection is probably the easiest of all tasks. 
Failure prediction will require recognition techniques, logic, an extensive 
data base and system model. A suitable data base is also the key to 
degraded mode operation. Automatic energy management is very straight­
forward. The major obstacle in automatic energy management is its 
real-time requirement. It is expected that by 1985 computing power will be 
so cheap that the real-time requirement can be met by the brute-force 
approach. Recognition techniques should by now be developed with 
sufficient power to do natural language communication and automatic
